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Abstract
Determining the distribution of the conservation burden and benefit is a critical challenge to 
the conservation and management of trans-boundary fish stocks. Given current levels of over-
fishing and overcapacity in many trans-boundary fisheries, some or all participating States 
must necessarily reach a compromise with regard to their interests and carry some share of the 
conservation burden. This article proposes a new approach to distributing the conservation 
burden and benefit in trans-boundary fisheries, and explores this approach in the world’s larg-
est tuna fishery: the tropical tuna fisheries of the western and central Pacific. Such an approach 
would enable Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) to transparently 
ensure that conservation burden and benefit distributions are consistent with international 
obligations. The article recommends that RFMOs consider developing decision-making 
frameworks that would enable existing scientific processes to determine the necessary extent of 
conservation measures, while a new conservation burden methodology would then determine 
the implementation of the measure and its impact on each member.
Keywords
conservation burden and benefit; tuna; fisheries governance; western and central Pacific 
 fisheries
Introduction
In 2012 the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) 
reported that global marine catches were in decline, with increased percent-
ages of global fish stocks identified as over-exploited. The FAO found that the 
* This article was partially supported by the NF-UBC Nereus Program, a collaborating inter-
disciplinary initiative of The Nippon Foundation and six research institutions.
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state of world marine fisheries was worsening and this has had a negative 
impact on fisheries production.1 Concerned States have noted that current 
levels of fishing are unsustainable and “. . . leading inexorably to an impending 
crisis for global marine fisheries.”2 This article builds on arguments that the 
primary cause of this impending crisis is the failure of States to transparently 
and equitably distribute the conservation burden and benefit, and thereby 
enable the adoption of sufficiently strong measures to reduce overfishing to 
sustainable levels and remove overcapacity.3 Determining the distribution of 
the conservation burden and benefit at the international level is a contentious 
issue as regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) struggle to 
respond to growing concerns regarding overfishing and overcapacity. 
Given current levels of overfishing, conservation measures are required that 
reduce fishing mortality. Such conservation measures will impose a conserva-
tion burden or benefit on some or all participating States. In order to imple-
ment these measures, governments must fund national institutions to 
implement and govern national regulations, while potentially increasing the 
management costs on their fishing fleets and fishing grounds through limita-
tions on fishing opportunities and more complex and costly licensing arrange-
ments. Depending upon their structure, conservation measures will affect 
various participants directly and indirectly: reducing benefits for some; limit-
ing opportunities for others; and protecting or even increasing benefits for yet 
others.  
Conservation measures may also affect developing States that depend sig-
nificantly on fisheries and have strong aspirations to further develop this 
resource. Some of these States may have few other development and resource 
options and will incur a relatively higher economic and social burden as a 
consequence of these conservation measures as compared to other States with 
diverse resources, large institutions and substantial revenue streams from mul-
tiple economic activities.
1 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations [FAO], Italy, 2012).
2 High Seas Task Force, Closing the Net: Stopping Illegal Fishing on the High Seas (Governments 
of Australia, Chile, Canada, Namibia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom plus WWF, 
IUCN and the Earth Institute, 2006). Accessed online June 2012 at: http://www.oecd.org/
sd-roundtable/aboutus/stoppingillegalfishingonthehighseas.htm.
3 Q Hanich, ‘Distributing the Bigeye Conservation Burden in the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 327–332; Q Hanich, ‘Distributing a Conservation Burden 
across Multiple Jurisdictions: A Case Study of the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’, 
in C Schofield, M-S Kwon, and S Lee (eds), The Limits of Maritime Jurisdiction (Brill/Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague, forthcoming).
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Thus, one can argue that the negotiation over the scope and application of 
a conservation measure is a negotiation over how the burden of conservation 
action is apportioned. The eventual decision will allocate the costs related to 
the conservation measures and the benefits that result (i.e., increased catch per 
unit of effort, enhanced fishing opportunities). Negotiations have to balance 
diverse interests and come to an agreement over how these interests are com-
promised. Nevertheless, RFMOs do not transparently study the likely distri-
bution of the conservation burden and benefit that would arise from each 
potential management option. Instead, RFMOs address deeply political and 
economic arguments within a scientific framework. These frameworks then 
become politicized as members favour scientific assessments for measures that 
best protect their own interests, and refute scientific assessments for measures 
that compromise their interests.4 Consequently, these frameworks become 
political tools rather than effective management tools, creating room for par-
ticipating countries to focus on individual interests rather than to search for 
the common ground required to achieve a useful outcome. Ultimately, the 
lack of a framework to address political and equity considerations undermines 
the fisheries science while still leaving the political and economic questions 
unanswered.
This article proposes that RFMOs adopt a new transparent approach to 
distributing the conservation burden and benefit in trans-boundary fisheries, 
and explores this approach in the world’s largest tuna fishery: the tropical tuna 
fisheries of the western and central Pacific. The article recommends that 
RFMOs consider developing decision-making frameworks that enable fisher-
ies science to determine the necessary extent of conservation measures, while 
a new conservation burden methodology would then determine the imple-
mentation of the measures and their impact on each member.
The International Legal Framework for Distributing the Conservation 
Burden and Benefit in International Fisheries
At the most basic level, it is important that the distribution of the conserva-
tion burden and benefit is consistent within the existing international legal 
framework. Given the multi-jurisdictional nature of international fisheries, it 
4 Policansky notes that “marine fishery-resource controversies are couched in scientific terms, 
although often they are not scientific disputes.” D Policansky, ‘Science and Decision Making 
in Fisheries Management’ in T Pitcher, P Hart and D Pauly (eds), Reinventing Fisheries 
 Management (Fish and Fisheries Series, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, 2001) 
57–71, 67.
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is important to recognise State sovereignty concerns and develop an approach 
that equitably addresses such concerns while working across all jurisdictions 
(the principle of sovereign equality allows States to authorise and undertake 
activities within their territory, free of external interference within interna-
tionally agreed limits).5
Beyond the foundation concept of State sovereignty, a legal framework for 
distributing the conservation burden is provided by the United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC),6 the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement (UNFSA),7 the FAO Code of Conduct8 and an umbrella of sup-
plementary binding and non-binding agreements. Collectively, these agree-
ments provide the international fisheries governance framework within which 
States cooperate and negotiate measures that apply and distribute a conserva-
tion burden and benefit. This framework is further elaborated by other bind-
ing and non-binding agreements, United Nations General Assembly 
Resolutions and decisions in case law that elaborate broad principles that may 
affect international fisheries governance and the distribution of any conserva-
tion burden or benefit.9
5 The Principle of Sovereign Equality was further articulated during the later 20th Century to 
recognise the permanent sovereignty that States have over their natural resources. However, 
these rights are limited by obligations to consider, and not infringe unduly upon, the sover-
eignty and sovereign rights of other States in their exercise of their own territorial sovereignty 
or sovereign rights. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Amongst States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 2625 
(XXV); Twenty-Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly (New York, 24 October 
1970). See also: Charter of the United Nations. Opened for signature 26 June 1945; entered 
into force 24 October 1945; New York, USA. Available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/
charter/intro.shtml. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1803 (XVII), Permanent Sov-
ereignty over Natural Resources, United Nations General Assembly (New York, 14 December 
1962).
6 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC). Opened for signature 
10 December 1982; entered into force 16 November 1994; Montego Bay, Jamaica (1982) 21 
International Legal Materials 1261.
7 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention of 
the Law of the Sea 10 December 1982, Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA). Opened for signature 
4 August 1995, entered into force 11 December 2001, New York, USA, (1995) 34 Interna-
tional Legal Materials 1542.
8 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted at the 28th Session of the FAO Confer-
ence, 31 October 1995, Rome, Italy. Accessed online July 2012 at: http://www.fao.org/
docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM.
9 For example, principles of sustainable and responsible development are derived from the 
broader environmental context of Agenda 21, the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED) and the resultant Convention on Biological Diversity 
(CBD). For selected readings on Agenda 21, UNCED and the CBD and their impact on 
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Four factors significantly influence what principles apply in the context of 
distributing a conservation burden and benefit. These are: the location of the 
fishing activity; requirements for cooperation and non-discriminatory partici-
pation; requirements to consider developing State concerns; and principles of 
conservation and management.
First, the location of the fishing activity is significant due to the zonal 
framework established by the LOSC. The LOSC recognises coastal State sov-
ereignty over its internal waters, territorial seas and archipelagic waters10 and 
grants coastal States “absolute and unfettered” control over the exploitation, 
conservation and management of fisheries within these waters under State 
sovereignty.11 The LOSC prescribes no specific duty to cooperate in relation 
to fisheries in waters under State sovereignty (except for the limited obligation 
on archipelagic States regarding immediately adjacent neighbouring States).12 
Other than a generalised obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment,13 the LOSC does not prescribe any obligation for coastal States 
to conserve or utilise fisheries within waters under sovereignty.14
Next, the LOSC grants coastal States sovereign rights over the exploitation, 
conservation and management of the natural resources within its Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ).15 Coastal States do not hold sovereignty over their 
EEZ, but rather hold rights and responsibilities over the activities that occur 
within these waters, such as fisheries.16 The LOSC provides that fisheries 
within the EEZ can only be exploited with the consent of the coastal State, 
subject to specific provisions that oblige the coastal State to: manage and con-
serve fisheries in EEZs;17 promote their optimum utilisation and share their 
fisheries governance, see: A Yankov, ‘The Law of the Sea Convention and Agenda 21: Marine 
Environmental Implications’ in A Boyle and D Freestone (eds), International Law and Sustain-
able Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1999) 271–296. W T Burke, ‘UNCED and the Oceans’ (1993) 17 Marine Policy 519–533.
10 Part II and Part IV, LOSC.
11 E Hey, ‘The Fisheries Provisions of the LOS Convention’ in E Hey (ed) Developments in 
International Fisheries Law (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 1999) 13–29. 
12 Parts II and IV, LOSC.
13 Part XII, LOSC.
14 Hey, supra note 11. 
15 Article 56, LOSC.
16 F Orrego Vicuña, The Exclusive Economic Zone: Regime and Legal Nature under International 
Law, Cambridge Studies in International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1989).
17 Article 61, LOSC.
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surplus catch;18 and cooperate with other States and relevant organisations to 
ensure conservation and promote the optimum utilisation of fish stocks.19
For fisheries in waters beyond national jurisdiction, the LOSC continues 
the global commons status for the high seas and provides that no State may 
validly purport to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty.20 Simi-
larly, the LOSC continues to apply the traditional freedom of the seas to the 
high seas, thereby granting all States an equal right to fish the high seas.21 An 
early consequence of these equal rights was the creation of an obligation not 
to interfere with the vessels of other States on the high seas, nor impose on 
their rights.22 The modern concept of flag State primacy devolved from origi-
nal assertions that vessels at sea were figuratively a piece of territory of the 
State under whose flag they sailed. The LOSC builds upon this traditional 
principle and assigns exclusive flag State jurisdiction over vessels on the high 
seas.23 These flag State rights are balanced by obligations which impose a duty 
to cooperate and require flag States to manage their high seas fishing activities 
at sustainable levels.24   
Second, given the international nature of these fisheries, a cooperative 
approach is required that enables compatible conservation and management 
measures to be implemented throughout the range of the stocks at the appro-
priate regional, sub-regional and national levels. The UNFSA elaborates a 
principle of compatible management which provides that coastal States and 
States fishing on the high seas have a duty to cooperate for the purpose of 
achieving compatible measures for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks 
in their entirety.25 In practice, this may require some compromises between 
18 Article 62, LOSC.
19 Articles 61, 62, 69, 70, 71, 72 and 73, LOSC.
20 Articles 86 and 89, LOSC.
21 Article 87, LOSC. This concept of freedom of the seas was most famously developed and 
articulated by Hugo Grotius in 1604–05 in his book Mare Liberum. Grotius developed a 
substantial theoretical and historical argument that nature constituted the inexhaustible oceans 
and air for common use—that these were the common property of all. Behind the theory was 
the pragmatic purpose for the doctrine: defending the vested commercial interests of the 
Dutch against the extensive maritime claims of the Portuguese. After some contention, this 
principle came to dominate ocean governance and global fisheries for the next 400 years. 
H Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (Oxford University Press, Oxford). This publication is a 
translation of the Latin text published in 1604 and was produced in 1916).
22 R Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (Publications on Ocean Devel-
opment, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2004).
23 Articles 91, 92 and 94 of the LOSC are particularly relevant.
24 Articles 61, 62, 63, 64, 116, 117, 118, 119, LOSC. This duty to cooperate is further elabo-
rated for anadromous (Article 66) and catadromous stocks (Article 67), transboundary and 
straddling stocks (Article 63), and highly migratory stocks (Article 64).
25 Article 7.2, UNFSA.
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flag and coastal States as they ensure the compatibility of flag State measures 
for fleets fishing on the high seas with coastal State measures for fisheries in 
waters under national jurisdiction.26
While the UNFSA significantly expands obligations regarding cooperation 
for fisheries in EEZs and the high seas, it provides little guidance for coastal 
waters under State sovereignty. The general principles of the UNFSA specifi-
cally refer to the LOSC’s duty to cooperate.27 Given that the LOSC prescribes 
a duty to cooperate only for fisheries within EEZs and on the high seas, it 
would appear reasonable to interpret the mandate for the UNFSA as also 
limited to EEZs and high seas.28 This interpretation is further supported by 
the UNFSA’s Articles 3 and 7: these specifically refer to the protection of a 
coastal State’s “sovereign rights” when discussing waters under national juris-
diction, and do not refer to any issues relating to sovereignty, as might occur 
in discussions regarding fisheries management within waters under State 
 sovereignty.
The UNFSA expands upon the LOSC and standardises RFMOs as the 
appropriate form of cooperation, and requires fishing States and coastal States 
to give effect to their duty to cooperate by establishing an RFMO or arrange-
ment where none exists.29 Where RFMOs exist, the UNFSA requires States to 
cooperate through joining, or participating in, a RFMO or arrangement, or at 
a minimum applying the conservation and management measures established 
by such organisations or arrangements.30
Perhaps most powerfully, the UNFSA explicitly prescribes that only those 
States which agree to implement measures of an existing RFMO (in regard to 
highly migratory and straddling stocks) shall have access to the fishery resources 
to which those measures apply.31 This extension of the duty to cooperate sig-
nificantly extends the authority of relevant RFMOs as it indirectly binds all 
UNFSA parties to apply all relevant RFMO conservation measures, regardless 
of their status in relation to each RFMO. In effect, this limits the freedom to 
fish on the high seas for straddling and highly migratory fisheries and institu-
tionalises the duty to cooperate (in regard to straddling and highly migratory 
26 A Oude Elferink, ‘The Determination of Compatible Conservation and Management Mea-
sures for Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ in J Frowein, R Wolfrum and C Philipp 
(eds), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 
2001) 551–607.
27 Article 5, UNFSA.
28 Note that Article 3 of UNFSA qualifies its application to waters under national 
 jurisdiction.
29 Article 8.5, UNFSA.
30 Article 8, UNFSA.
31 Article 8.4, UNFSA.
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fisheries) through the mechanism of RFMOs.32 Recent commentary indicates 
that UNFSA provisions relating to the duty to cooperate may be developing 
sufficient customary status under international law to also limit the freedom 
to fish for States that are neither party to the UNFSA, nor to the relevant 
RFMO.33
On the question of participation, it is important to note that RFMOs are 
under an obligation to operate in a non-discriminatory and transparent man-
ner and open their membership to States with a “real interest”. The LOSC and 
the UNFSA establish basic principles that States shall cooperate to establish 
fisheries organisations and that the States concerned shall ensure that conser-
vation measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in 
fact against the fishermen of any State.34 Neither the LOSC nor the UNFSA 
offer further guidance on the definition of “real interest”. Although the defini-
tion of “real interest” is unclear, the general view is that the concept of real 
interest should not be interpreted in an exclusive manner.35 In the context of 
distributing a conservation burden or benefit, at a minimum, adjacent coastal 
States and states fishing for stocks on the high seas inside the area in question 
are generally regarded as having a real interest and therefore have a right to 
participate in the relevant RFMOs.36
Deliberations over participatory rights are determined within the zonal 
framework established by the LOSC. Coastal States hold exclusive rights to 
fisheries within their waters, while all flag States and adjacent coastal States 
share participatory rights over fisheries on the high seas, as qualified by the 
LOSC, the UNFSA, and the relevant RFMO. In this context, it is important 
to distinguish between participatory rights and allocations made through a 
rights-based management approach. Participatory rights simply recognise the 
right of a State to allow its vessels and nationals to participate in a fishery. 
Allocation determines what share of the fishery that each State may hold. It is 
possible that a State may have participatory rights for its vessels and nationals 
to fish within a RFMO’s jurisdiction, but not have any allocation for those 
32 Rayfuse argues that UNFSA operationalises the duty to cooperate: “perhaps the single most 
significant aspect of this operationalisation, is the ‘institutionalisation’ of the duty to cooperate 
by requiring its exercise through RFOs (RFMOs).” Rayfuse, supra note 22, at 43.
33 T Henriksen, ‘Revisiting the Freedom of Fishing and Legal Obligations on States Not Party 
to Regional Fisheries Management Organisations’ (2009) 40 Ocean Development and Interna-
tional Law 80–96.
34 Articles 118 and 119.3, LOSC; Article 8.3, UNFSA.
35 E Molenaar, ‘The Concept of Real Interest and Other Aspects of Cooperation Through 
Regional Fisheries Management Mechanisms’ (2000) 15 International Journal of Marine and 
Coastal Law 475–531.
36 Ibid.
 Q. Hanich, Y. Ota /
  The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 28 (2013) 9
vessels to fish. In this case, these vessels would need to purchase access to the 
fishery from a coastal State with a surplus, or trade an allocation with another 
flag State.
The UNFSA provides for the issue of allocation as a substantive matter for 
RFMOs to consider, but does not consider it a fundamental requirement. It 
is qualified by the words “as appropriate,” and allows RFMOs the flexibility to 
determine whether it is appropriate to their regional circumstances to allocate 
rights to the fisheries within their jurisdiction.37 Similarly, the FAO Code of 
Conduct does not prescribe allocation processes but advises that in order to 
assist decision-making on the allocation and use of coastal resources, States 
should promote the assessment of their respective values taking into account 
economic, social and cultural factors.38
The third factor that must be considered when distributing a conservation 
burden or benefit in international fisheries is the impact of any conservation 
burden on developing States and artisanal fishers. The special requirements 
and needs of developing States, particularly small island developing States, are 
recognised at a global level.39 The UNFSA requires that States shall take into 
account the special requirements of developing States when giving effect to 
the duty to cooperate. In effect, RFMOs must consider: the vulnerability of 
developing States that are dependent on the exploitation of fisheries, includ-
ing food security concerns; the need to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure 
access to fisheries by, subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and women 
fishworkers, as well as indigenous people in these States, particularly small 
island developing States; and the need to ensure that measures do not result in 
transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation 
action onto developing States.40 At the global level, the UNFSA articulates the 
principle that the global community interest in the conservation of fisheries 
37 Article 10, UNFSA.
38 Paragraph 10.2.2, FAO Code of Conduct. Accessed online July 2012 at: http://www.fao
.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM.
39 Consideration of these requirements, and of the importance of marine resources to the 
sustainable development of small island states, has also been included within other globally 
significant but not legally binding documents, such as the Barbados Programme of Action for 
the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the World Summit for 
Sustainable Development’s (WSSD) Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Barbados Pro-
gramme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. Global 
Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States. (Bridgetown, 
Barbados 25 April to 6 May 1994). Johannesburg Plan of Implementation on Sustainable Devel-
opment. World Summit on Sustainable Development. (Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August 
to 4 December 2002).
40 Article 24, UNFSA.
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should not result in a disproportionate burden of conservation action on 
developing States.41
Modern international fisheries governance also explicitly recognises the 
concerns of artisanal and subsistence fishers. The UNFSA and the FAO Code 
of Conduct both set out the principle that RFMO members shall take into 
account the interests of artisanal and subsistence fishers when giving effect to 
their duty to cooperate42 and avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure access to 
fisheries by, subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers, as 
well as indigenous people in developing States parties, particularly small island 
developing States parties, and territories and possessions.43 The LOSC also 
explicitly refers to the interest of fishing communities in regard to the estab-
lishment of conservation and management measures for EEZs.44
Fourth, modern international fisheries governance sets out conservation 
and management principles that directly affect the adoption of conservation 
and management measures, and the subsequent extent of any conservation 
burden. The LOSC, the UNFSA and various other global fisheries and envi-
ronment agreements require that conservation and management decisions 
shall be based on the best scientific evidence available,45 and take into account 
traditional knowledge of the resources and their habitat46 as well as relevant 
environmental and economic47 and social factors,48 including the special 
requirements of developing States.49
Fisheries science has an inherently high degree of uncertainty which can be 
a significant obstacle to fisheries management.50 Modern international  fisheries 
41 L Juda, ‘The 1995 United Nations Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migra-
tory Fish Stocks: A Critique’ (1997) 28 Ocean Development and International Law 147–166.
42 Article 5, UNFSA; Paragraph 7.7.2(c), FAO Code of Conduct.
43 Article 24.2(b), UNFSA.
44 Article 61, LOSC. In addition, Schram and Tahindro argue that recognition of coastal State 
rights and duties in Article 116 of the LOSC sufficiently encompasses coastal fishing com-
munities to allow for their consideration in regard to high seas fisheries. G G Schram and 
A Tahindro, ‘Developments in Principles for the Adoption of Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Measures’ in Hey, supra note 11 at 251–286.
45 Articles 61 and 119, LOSC; Article 5, UNFSA; Paragraph 6.4, FAO Code of Conduct.
46 Paragraph 6.4, FAO Code of Conduct.
47 Articles 61 and 119, LOSC; Article 5, UNFSA; Paragraph 6.4, FAO Code of Conduct.
48 Paragraph 6.4; FAO Code of Conduct.
49 Articles 61 and 119, LOSC; Article 5, UNFSA.
50 Butterworth describes fisheries assessment as an inexact science “in which uncertainty is 
pervasive” and Christensen and Pauly note that the level of uncertainty in fisheries stock assess-
ments can be formidable. D Butterworth, ‘Science and Fisheries Management: Entering the 
New Millennium’ in M H Nordquist and J Moore (eds), Current Fisheries Issues and the Food 
and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston, 
2000) 37–54, 39; V Christensen and D Pauly, ‘Placing Fisheries in their Ecosystem Context, 
An Introduction’ (2004) 172 Ecological Modelling 103–107.
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governance partly accounts for this inherent uncertainty by setting a low 
benchmark at “best available scientific evidence”, implying that decisions shall 
be based on weak or poor science if that is recognised as the best available. 
Such uncertainties are further addressed through the application of a precau-
tionary approach which requires that States “shall be more cautious when 
information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate”.51 States must not use the 
absence of adequate scientific information as a reason for postponing or fail-
ing to take conservation and management measures.52 The precautionary 
approach considers potential long-term impacts on living marine resources 
and their environment, and requires the development of reference points and 
decision-making rules to avoid or mitigate undesirable outcomes.53
The UNFSA and the FAO Code of Conduct incorporate principles that 
apply a “precautionary approach widely to conservation and management of 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the 
living marine resources and preserve the marine environment”.54 In addition, 
they also build on LOSC provisions relating to associated and dependent spe-
cies55 and elaborate an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management 
that recognises the interrelated nature of marine ecosystems.56 This includes 
establishing standards for the protection of marine biodiversity and the assess-
ment, management, minimisation and monitoring of impacts on associated 
and dependent species and the marine environment.57 The FAO subsequently 
coordinated a number of activities and papers that further developed princi-
ples for an ecosystem-based approach, including the principle that “gover-
nance should ensure both human and ecosystem well-being and equity”58 
51 Article 6.2, UNFSA.
52 Article 6.2, UNFSA; Paragraph 7.5, FAO Code of Conduct.
53 Article 6 and Annex II, UNFSA. Undesirable outcomes include: “overexploitation of 
resources, overdevelopment of harvesting capacity, loss of biodiversity, major physical distur-
bances of sensitive biotopes, or social or economic dislocations.” For further elaboration, see: 
FAO, Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions. Elaborated by the 
Technical Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species 
Introductions) (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 1995).
54 Article 6, UNFSA. Similar language occurs in Paragraph 7.5.1, Code of Conduct.
55 Articles 61 and 119, LOSC.
56 Article 192 of the LOSC established the principle that all States have an obligation to pro-
tect and preserve the marine environment. This obligation is universal within the context of 
the LOSC and applies to all activities and all waters, including waters under national jurisdic-
tion. Articles 61 and 119 applied this principle directly to fisheries and established the frame-
work for an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. For further discussion, see: 
H Wang, ‘Ecosystem Management and its Application to Large Marine Ecosystems: Science, 
Law and Politics’ (2004) 35 Ocean Development and International Law 41–74.
57 Articles 5 and 6, UNFSA.
58 FAO, Fisheries Management #2—The Ecosystem Approach to Fisheries (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, Rome, 2003).
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These developments build on provisions within the Code of Conduct and 
focus significantly on social and inter-generational equity concerns.59
A critical question of interpretation arises when considering the implemen-
tation of an ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management in the context 
of distributing a conservation burden or benefit. The FAO Technical Guide-
lines note that mixed-species fisheries require consideration of the different 
vulnerabilities and productivities of the various species that may be caught 
together.60 For example, the western and central Pacific purse-seine fishery 
captures skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna. Each of these species has signifi-
cantly different characteristics. In such circumstances, the Guidelines recom-
mend, inter alia, that catch limits for target species may need to be modified 
to control catches of more vulnerable species.61 However, the FAO Technical 
Guidelines and the UNFSA both allow for the consideration of human “well-
being and equity” and “. . . economic factors, including the special require-
ments of developing States.”62 This could be interpreted as allowing for the 
adoption of catch or effort limits that would be sustainable for skipjack, but 
result in significant levels of overfishing for bigeye if such measures were to 
protect developing coastal States who primarily benefit from purse-seine 
catches of skipjack, and receive little benefit from bigeye.
This question of interpretation presents a key challenge for RFMOs as they 
consider conservation measures that apply a conservation burden or provide a 
benefit. The multi-species and multi-gear characteristics of many international 
fisheries, such as tuna, are likely to create significant challenges for the estab-
lishment of target and limit reference points, and for agreed management 
responses. For example, some Pacific island coastal States argue that the 
explicit reference to “as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors” allows for conservation measures that would allow continued over-
fishing of bigeye in order to promote the optimum utilisation of skipjack and 
albacore, as long as the bigeye biomass remains above a limit reference point 
sufficient to ensure long-term levels of reproduction and recruitment.63 On 
the other hand, some commentators have argued that such an approach might 
59 These developments are important because they prescribe internationally recommended 
standards that were developed through global consultative processes. Article 5 UNFSA requires 
States to take into account generally recommended international minimum standards and 
recommended practices and procedures). 
60 FAO, Fisheries Management #2, supra note 58.
61 Ibid.
62 Article 5(b), UNFSA.
63 L Clarke, ‘Implementation of the Precautionary Approach and Reference Points’ in Q Han-
ich and M Tsamenyi (eds), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implemen-
tation of International Fisheries Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region (Australian 
National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, Wollongong, 2009) 284–301.
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be inconsistent with the provisions in the LOSC relating to associated and 
dependent species and that it would be “improper to ensure the maintenance 
of one or more living resources by endangering one or more other stocks”.64
In summary, the operation of these four factors (i.e. location, participation, 
developing status, and conservation requirements) frames the distribution of 
the conservation burden and benefit in the following ways. If the fishing activity 
in question occurs within waters under State sovereignty, then conservation is 
almost entirely at the discretion of the coastal State, subject to the responsibility 
to not cause harm to others and a general LOSC responsibility on all parties to 
protect and preserve the marine environment, and related requirements in 
LOSC Part XII.65 If the fishing activity occurs within an EEZ, or on the high 
seas, then the responsible coastal and flag States are required to cooperate and 
implement conservation measures in accordance with the principles of interna-
tional fisheries governance discussed above, including the requirements of 
LOSC Part XII. RFMOs are the formally endorsed mechanism in international 
law for such cooperation and they are required to implement the principles 
identified above relating to participation, decision-making and conservation 
(including precautionary and ecosystem-based approaches to fisheries manage-
ment). It is important to note that RFMOs are also explicitly required to ensure 
that conservation measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a 
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States.
Key Questions for Distributing the Conservation Burden and Benefit
Existing processes fail to successfully resolve the political aspects of conserva-
tion negotiations, and consequently RFMO members are proving to be 
unwilling to reach a compromise with regard to their interests. Measures are 
opposed or weakened as each member argues for exemptions, or will only sup-
port measures that will minimally affect their own interests.66 Some commen-
tators argue that some form of property or use right must be distributed 
among participants in order to address overfishing and reduce excess capacity 
effectively.67 A rights-based management approach allocates fishing rights to 
64 B Applebaum and A Donohue, ‘The Role of Regional Fisheries Management Organisa-
tions’ in Hey, supra note 11 at 217–249.
65 Article 192, LOSC.
66 Q Hanich, Interest and Influence—A Snapshot of the Western and Central Pacific Tropical 
Tuna Fisheries (Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security, Wollongong, 
2011). Available at http://ro.uow.edu.au/uowbooks/1.
67 For selected readings on rights-based management, see: V Kaitala and G Munro, ‘The Man-
agement of High Seas Fisheries’ (1993) 8 Marine Resource Economics 183–196; R Allen, 
W Bayliff, J Joseph and D Squires, ‘Rights-Based Management in Transnational Tuna  Fisheries’ 
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stakeholders (i.e., fishers, vessels, companies, cooperatives, and fishing com-
munities) and defines the limits and usage of these rights. Such an approach 
allocates the benefits of the fishery. Proponents suggest that the lack of specific 
rights in a fishery undermines incentives for conservation, whereas a rights-
based management approach would give stakeholders incentives to fish in a 
manner that ensured the long-term sustainability and economic viability of 
the fishery.68
However, applying rights-based management approaches to international 
fisheries requires first that the participating coastal and flag States agree on 
their national allocations before these rights can be assigned further down to 
stakeholders. Determining such rights through an explicit allocation process 
is highly fraught and can consume years of effort, particularly as allocation 
decisions generally require consensus.69 These challenges are further exacer-
bated for international fisheries that include significant catches from waters 
under national jurisdiction and the high seas.70 Consequently, RFMOs have 
found it immensely difficult to reach agreement on basic principles to deter-
mine allocations between States. While energies are focused on allocation 
negotiations, overfishing may continue and could potentially be exacerbated 
as the consideration of historical catch in allocation negotiations encourages a 
race-to-fish mentality to build up a catch history.71 Where RFMOs have allo-
cated rights to a fishery, these have sometimes failed to limit fishing catches or 
in R Allen, J Joseph, D Squires (eds), Conservation and Management of Transnational Tuna 
Fisheries (Wiley-Blackwell, Ames, Iowa, 2010) 65–86.
68 J Joseph, D Squires, W Bayliff and T Groves, ‘Addressing the Problem of Excess Fishing 
Capacity in Tuna Fisheries’ in Allen et al., ibid., at 11–38; A Willock and I Cartwright, Con-
servation Implications of Allocation under the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WWF Australia and TRAFFIC Oceania, Sydney, 2006).
69 M Lodge, D Anderson, T Lobach, G Munro, K Sainsbury and A Willock, Recommended 
Best Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Report of an Independent Panel 
for Improved Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (Chatham House, 
London, 2007).
70 In 2010, the Japanese government stated at an international tuna workshop that allocation 
was a very difficult issue, particularly in the context of the WCPO tuna fisheries where much 
of the catch is taken from within EEZs. Personal notes. Comments by Masanori Miyahara, 
Chief Counsellor. Fisheries Agency of Japan. Commissioner and Head Delegate to the 
WCPFC. Comments made on 30 June 2010 at Kobe II International Workshop on RFMO 
Management of Tuna Fisheries. (Brisbane, Australia. 29 June to 1 July 2010).
71 A “race to fish” can occur where fleets attempt to rapidly build up a catch history to support 
imminent negotiations for an allocation that may be partly or wholly based on their historical 
catch. M Lodge and S Nandan, ‘Some Suggestions Towards Better Implementation of the 
United Nations Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 1995’ 
(2005) 20 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 345–379.
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effort, as agreed limits have been subsequently increased to accommodate new 
entrants.72
Some RFMOs have deferred any explicit allocation of the benefits of the 
fishery due to failures to agree on basic principles, but have nevertheless dis-
tributed a conservation burden and benefit through the adoption of conserva-
tion and management measures. In the stalemate vacuum that surrounds 
rights-based management failures, the distribution of the conservation bur-
den and benefit becomes in effect an interim reverse allocation. However, this 
approach does not support the negotiation of strong measures because it does 
not provide a transparent or equitable framework for a politically acceptable 
distribution of the conservation burden and benefit. Furthermore, these 
implicit allocations last only as long as the conservation and management 
measures are in force.
And herein lies the problem, and an opportunity. Rather than continue 
attempts to fit stakeholder-based rights-based management into an interna-
tional context, this article proposes that RFMOs adopt a new approach to the 
distribution of the conservation burden and benefit. This should work within 
existing international principles of fisheries governance and expand conserva-
tion negotiations to include a transparent methodology for the equitable dis-
tribution of the conservation burden and benefit. This article suggests that it 
is likely to be more productive to build on the conservation momentum and 
establish a transparent framework that defines the parameters for how it dis-
tributes the conservation burden and benefit. This would also avoid disagree-
ments regarding whether RFMOs can extend allocation regimes into EEZs.
Most importantly, such an approach would answer important equity ques-
tions that are fundamental to transparency in conservation and management 
negotiations and provide clarity and certainty to conservation negotiations. 
Some of these equity questions are presented in Table 1.
Developing a New Approach to the Distribution of the Conservation 
Burden and Benefit
This article proposes that RFMOs develop a new approach for addressing 
these questions, implemented through decision-making frameworks that 
transparently and equitably distribute the conservation burden and benefit. 
72 C Hedley, R Churchill and L De La Fayette, Perspectives for the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement (European Parliament, Directorate-General for Internal Policies of the Union, 
Brussels, 2007). Accessed online July 2012 at: http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/
v9878e00.HTM.
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Table 1. Questions of Equity in Distributing the Conservation Burden and Benefit
Factors Questions of Equity Considerations
Coastal States 
and Flag States
Should RFMOs value the shared nature of 
(flag State) common rights to high seas fish-
eries as equal or less than the exclusive nature 
of (coastal State) sovereign rights over fisher-
ies within EEZs? How should these rights be 
weighed against the absolute sovereignty that 
coastal States hold over fisheries within their 
waters under State sovereignty?
LOSC and UNFSA prescribe no specific duty 
to cooperate or conservation responsibilities 
on coastal States for waters under State sover-
eignty. UNFSA protects coastal State and flag 




How should RFMOs consider the limited 
options available to artisanal communities in 
coastal developing States, compared to the 
diversity of food enjoyed by consumers in 
distant markets?
UNFSA requires RFMOs to consider the 
vulnerability and needs of developing States 






How should RFMOs balance the distribu-
tion of the conservation burden between 
artisanal and subsistence fisheries compared 
to large-scale industrial fishing fleets?
LOSC and UNFSA require consideration of 
artisanal and subsistence interests, but makes 
no such similar accommodation for industrial 
fleets. Similarly, UNFSA requires RFMOs to 
consider the needs of coastal States whose 
economies are dependent mainly on fishing 
for the stocks in question, but provides no 
such explicit requirement for consideration of 
distant-water fishing fleets (beyond the general 
equal consideration of “ . . . respective interests, 
fishing patterns and fishing practices of new 
and existing members . . . ”.
Polluter Pays or 
Race to Fish 
Should RFMOs incorporate the principle of 
“polluter pays” into fisheries measures and 
focus the conservation burden on those 
States who are historically responsible for 
overfishing, or focus the distribution of the 
conservation burden on new entrants, pro-
tecting States with historically high fishing 
levels. 
Neither LOSC nor UNFSA provides guidance 
on whether States with a historical interest, or 
new entrants, should be protected or pun-
ished. UNFSA prescribes that various issues, 
including historical levels and the respective 
interests of new entrants and historically 
active participants must be considered, but 
does not value their interests.
Mixed Benefits 




How should RFMOs recognise the mixed 
benefits and costs in multi-gear/multi-species 
fisheries?
If one fleet (e.g., longline) will benefit from 
conservation-related reductions in fisheries, 
should those States with significant interests 
in that fleet bear a greater share of the conser-
vation burden than those States with minimal 




How should the development aspirations of 
developing States be recognised in practice?
International fisheries governance prescribes 
that RFMOs must not transfer a dispropor-
tionate burden of conservation action onto 
developing States, but provides no such pro-
tection for developed States.
New entrants How should States account for new entrants 
in a manner that is consistent with the LOSC 
and UNFSA while recognising the fully 
fished/overfished nature of most international 
fisheries? 
UNFSA prescribes that various issues, includ-
ing historical levels and the respective interests 
of new entrants and historically active partici-
pants must be considered but does not value 
their interests.
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Such a new approach would move beyond the conceptual level of rights-based 
models and provide concrete steps that explicitly determine what conserva-
tion burden or benefit each State would carry, depending on their national 
characteristics. This would modernise fisheries management to be more con-
sistent with broader developments in common resource management (such as 
climate change) that incorporate principles of differentiated responsibilities 
(between developed and developing States).73
The approach would address the questions identified above and define the 
areas of interest relevant to the distribution of the conservation burden, con-
sistent with core principles of international fisheries governance. These areas 
of interest could include the following:
•  Coastal State interests in their waters under State sovereignty and in their 
EEZ:
 –  Opportunity for domestic fleets and artisanal fishers to fish inside 
national waters;
 –  Opportunity to provide immediate food security for coastal commu-
nities;
 –  Opportunity to license foreign vessels to fish in national waters.
•  Flag State distant-water fishing interests
 –  Opportunity for registered vessels to fish.
•  Market/consumer interests
 –  Opportunity to supply processing operations;
 –  Opportunity to supply commercial markets.
•  Development aspirations
 –  Opportunities to develop domestic fishing fleets;
 –  Opportunities for domestic fishing fleets to fish in national waters, 
adjacent high seas, and further beyond;
 –  Opportunities to develop and supply domestic processing operations.
The approach would then develop a methodology for distributing the conser-
vation burden and benefit, based on specific values for each area of interest. 
Agreement on the values for each area would be developed in accordance with 
the international principles identified above and international practice. For 
example, values for interests in waters under sovereignty would need to 
73 Article 3, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened for signa-
ture 4 June 1992; entered into force 21 March 1994, New York (1992) 31(4) International 
Legal Materials 851.
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 consider the higher level of rights compared to the more limited sovereign 
rights that apply to EEZs, or the common rights that apply to the high seas.
The methodology would then prescribe the use of these values and how 
they would be applied to conservation measures. For example, if a limit refer-
ence point were exceeded, an independent fisheries science provider or RFMO 
scientific committee would determine the extent of the necessary conserva-
tion response to reduce fishing mortality down to the level of the target refer-
ence point. The fisheries science provider would then advise on the conservation 
measure options that would achieve this conservation response and their nec-
essary extent (i.e., restrictions or prohibitions on certain types of gear, areal 
and seasonal closures, capacity limits, catch/effort limits). This advice would 
only identify management options that are sufficient to achieve the necessary 
conservation response.
The methodology would then measure the impact of these alternative man-
agement options against the identified areas of interest and their agreed val-
ues. The methodology would then determine which of the alternate 
management options affected the areas of interest and values the least. The 
decision-making framework would then prescribe that this minimal impact 
option be adopted.
Such an approach would separate the scientific advice from the distribution 
of the conservation burden and benefit and therefore de-politicise the scien-
tific assessments and advice to a significant degree. Members would also be 
assured that their interests would be transparently and equitably considered in 
accordance with the agreed framework.
Ideally the approach would work alongside a harvest strategy that identifies 
target and limit reference points and prescribes management responses. In this 
context, the management response to an exceeded limit reference point would 
be to invoke the agreed methodology for distributing the conservation burden 
and benefit and develop a conservation measure in accordance with its pre-
agreed values. To demonstrate the approach, we present a case study below of 
how such a process might work in the context of the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) tuna fisheries.
A Case Study of the WCPO Tuna Fisheries—Political and Economic 
Interests
The WCPO stretches approximately 6,000 nautical miles across numerous 
jurisdictions, from the archipelagos of Southeast Asia to the remote atolls of 
Kiribati in the Central Pacific. This vast ocean is home to the world’s most 
productive tuna fisheries, supplying global markets with skipjack, bigeye, 
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 yellowfin and albacore worth approximately US$4.6 billion.74 While albacore 
catches are significant in local fisheries, the region is dominated by the large-
scale tropical longline and purse-seine fisheries for skipjack, yellowfin and 
bigeye. Fourteen States collectively dominate these tropical tuna fisheries and 
include: China, Chinese Taipei, Federated States of Micronesia, Indonesia, 
Japan, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Philip-
pines, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Tuvalu, and the United States.75
These fisheries are critically different from other tuna fisheries in that 87% 
of all reported WCPO tuna catches are harvested from waters under national 
jurisdiction.76 Unlike the high seas tuna fisheries of the Eastern Pacific, Indian 
Ocean and North Atlantic, the rights to the WCPO tuna fisheries are pre-
dominantly owned by a small group of developing coastal States. Fishing fleets 
depend upon access to these waters for their financial viability. No surface 
fishing fleet, either distant water or locally based, can profitably operate pole 
and line or purse-seine vessels without some access to waters under national 
jurisdiction.77
Nine of the coastal States identified above also control significant areas of 
archipelagic waters. Fiji, Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines and 
Vanuatu have all submitted claims for archipelagic status that are in accor-
dance with the LOSC and broadly recognised.78 The Solomon Islands is also 
considered to be an archipelagic State under the LOSC.79 In accordance with 
the LOSC, these States are all entitled to claim sovereignty over substantial 
archipelagic waters. Kiribati, the Marshall Islands and Tuvalu have also made 
declarations claiming archipelagic status, but these are inconsistent with the 
LOSC and are not shown on regional maps (see Fig. 1).80
74 Average delivered value 2008 to 2010. Derived from P Terawasi and L Rodwell, Value of 
WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel database) (Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solo-
mon Islands, 2011).
75 Calculations based on data derived from ibid. 
76 Calculations based on data derived from ibid.
77 G Van Santen and P Muller, Working Apart or Together: The Case for a Common Approach to 
Management of Tuna Resources in Exclusive Economic Zones of Pacific Island Countries (The 
World Bank, Washington, D.C., 2000).
78 United Nations, Maritime Space: Maritime Zones and Maritime Delimitation (2012). Avail-
able at: http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/asia.htm; accessed 
on 10 July 2012; R R Churchill and A V Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed., Melland Schill 
Studies in International Law, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1999).
79 Churchill and Lowe, ibid. 
80 United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: 
Declarations and Reservations (UN Publications, 2010). Accessed online July 2012 at: http://
www.un.org/Depts/los/doalos_publications/doalos_publications.htm; Churchill and Lowe, 
ibid. 
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Fig. 1. The WCPO.81
The mandated RFMO for these fisheries is the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), which was established in 2004 and includes 
all of the key coastal and distant-water fishing States.82 The WCPFC faces a 
complex conservation and management challenge. The scientific assessments 
indicate that urgent action is required to address overfishing and reduce fish-
ing mortality for bigeye, halt any increases in fishing mortality for yellowfin, 
reduce fishing mortality of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin, and develop precau-
tionary limits for skipjack.83 The conservation challenge is complicated by the 
multi-gear, multi-species and multi-national characteristics of the WCPO 
tropical tuna fisheries. Each species of tropical tuna is caught by each gear in 
a tightly intermeshed manner that is difficult, if not impossible, to separate. 
This complexity is exacerbated by the substantially different biological charac-
teristics of skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye (i.e., highly resilient and productive 
skipjack compared to the longer-lived and less productive bigeye).
81 Map sourced from: Q Hanich, C Schofield and P Cozens, ‘Oceans of Opportunity? The 
Limits of Maritime Claims in the Western and Central Pacific Region’ in Hanich and Tsame-
nyi, supra note 63 at 21–50.
82 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the West-
ern and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPF Convention). Opened for signature 5 September 2000, 
entered into force 19 June 2004, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. Available at http://
www.wcpfc.int. 
83 WCPFC, Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 9–17 August 2011).
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This intermeshed nature makes it extremely challenging to address a spe-
cific management challenge, such as overfishing of bigeye, with a narrowly 
focused management response. For example, the bigeye fishery is targeted 
almost entirely by longline vessels. However, the increasing use of fish aggre-
gating devices (FADs) by the purse-seine fishery has resulted in a significant 
bycatch of juvenile bigeye.84 Purse-seine sets on schools associated with FADs 
and logs will catch smaller fish, particularly juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, 
whereas sets on unassociated free-swimming schools (i.e., non-FAD sets) will 
catch larger skipjack and adult yellowfin.85 Proponents argue that FADs have 
increased the efficiency of purse seining,86 while others note that the signifi-
cant reduction in the size of fish caught undermines the efficiency gains.87 In 
addition to their significant impacts on bigeye and high levels of juvenile 
catch, scientists have raised concerns that the use of FADs may be creating an 
“ecological trap”.88
For the WCPFC to resolve the threat to bigeye, it must reduce longline 
catches, but also restrict the operation of purse-seine vessels utilising FADs 
that inadvertently catch bigeye while targeting the highly productive skipjack 
(not currently threatened by overfishing). Purse-seine fleets receive little ben-
efit from bigeye catches and so will receive little or no long-term sustainability 
benefit or increase in profitability if bigeye stocks rebuild. On the other hand, 
longline fleets will directly benefit from conservation measures that rebuild 
bigeye stocks as this will increase the profitability of longline fleets through 
improvements to their catch per unit of effort (CPUE). Balancing the inter-
ests between purse seine and longline, FAD and free school, high seas and 
84 N Davies, S Hoyle, S Harley, A Langley, P Kleiber and J Hampton, Stock Assessment of 
Bigeye Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 9–17 August 2011). Available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int.
85 A Langley, A Wright, G Hurry, J Hampton, T Aqorau and L Rodwell, ‘Slow Steps Towards 
Management of the World’s Largest Tuna Fishery’ (2009) 33(2) Marine Policy 271–279.
86 J Moron, J Areso and P Pallares, Statistics and Technical Information About the Spanish Purse 
Seine Fleet in the Pacific (14th Meeting of the Standing Committee on Tuna and Billfish, 
Noumea, New Caledonia, 9–16 August 2001).
87 A Fonteneau, P Pallares, J Sibert and Z Suzuki, ‘The Effect of Tuna Fisheries on Tuna 
Resources and Offshore Pelagic Ecosystems’ (2002) 16 Ocean Yearbook 142–170.
88 An ecological trap is an event whereby population growth is reduced due to individuals 
making poor habitat choices. Studies have suggested that tuna associated with FADs are less 
healthy than those in unassociated free-swimming schools. It has also been pointed out that 
the use of FADs is introducing further uncertainties into scientific assessments due to their 
impact on tuna behaviour. P Hallier and D Gaertner, ‘Drifting Fish Aggregation Devices 
Could Act as an Ecological Trap for Tropical Tuna Species’ (2008) Marine Ecology Progress 
Series 255–264.
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EEZs are all important factors in the distribution of the conservation burden 
and benefit. Another important factor is the benchmark year(s) to use to 
determine historical catch and effort levels.
The following figures illustrate some of these interests through providing an 
approximate indication of each State’s interest in these issues. These figures are 
based on an analysis of reported catches from within the WCPFC Statistical 
Area (the perceived range of the stocks) and are based on the most recent data 
available at the time of the study. Data are sourced from the 2011 WCPFC 
Yearbook excel database,89 and the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency’s 
Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries excel database.90 It is important to note the 
limitations of these figures due to the inaccurate reporting of species,91 mis-
reporting of catches by vessels,92 and the uncertainties due to the undefined 
western and northern boundaries of the WCPFC. Not all coastal States within 
the WCPFC Statistical Area currently provide tuna catch reports to the 
WCPFC or the Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC). China, Korea 
and Russia do not currently report any tuna catches, while Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Vietnam have only recently begun to develop the capacity to 
report tuna catches and consequently can suffer from significant uncertainties 
in catch data.
Fig. 2 illustrates the balance of interests for coastal States from purse seine 
to longline, while Fig. 3 presents the same analysis for flag States. These figures 
are based on the value of the tuna catch taken by their registered vessels or 
from waters under national jurisdiction in the benchmark year 2010. Fig. 4 
illustrates the balance of interests for flag and coastal States from FAD purse-
seine fisheries to non-FAD purse-seine fisheries and is based on catch data 
prior to the introduction of FAD restrictions in 2009. Fig. 5 presents a calcu-
lation of the balance of interests between the value of the catch from a State’s 
coastal waters and the value of the catch from that State’s distant-water fishing 
fleet (flag State interest). Where a State has no coastal waters within the 
89 P Williams, Tuna Fishery Yearbook: Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Raw 
Excel Database) (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, Pohnpei, Federated States 
of Micronesia, 2011). Available at http://www.wcpfc.int.
90 P Terawasi and L Rodwell, Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (Excel database) (Pacific Islands 
Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 2011).
91 P Williams, Scientific Data Available to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
Sixth Regular Session of the Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (Nuku’alofa, Tonga, 10–19 August 2009). Available at http://www.wcpfc.int.
92 D Soutar, Q Hanich, M Korsten, T Jones and J McCaffrie, Safeguarding the Stocks: A Report 
on Analytical Projects to Support the Development of a Regional MCS Strategy for Pacific Oceanic 
Fisheries (Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 2009).
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Fig. 2. Scale of coastal State interests from longline to purse seine (2010).
Fig. 3. Scale of flag State interests from longline to purse seine (2010).
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Fig. 4. Scale of flag State interests in purse-seine sets on drifting FADs/logs (average 
2002–2008).
Fig. 5. Scale of coastal State interests in purse-seine sets on drifting FADs/logs (aver-
age 2002–2008).
WCPO, that State is assessed to have a 100% flag State interest. Where a State 
does not report any catches from registered distant-water fishing vessels, that 
State is assessed to have a 100% coastal State interest.93 Figs. 6 and 7 demon-
strates the significance of benchmark years and illustrates the interests of States in 
the WCPO purse-seine and longline fisheries between 2001 and 2004, and in 
93 These values include albacore, skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye to represent the various 
longline interests held by each State within this context. Some flag State reports include char-
ter vessels that were registered to other States but reported under the charter State for the 
duration of the charter. For example, Niue did not have a registry in 2008 and depended upon 
a charter fleet of vessels from New Zealand and the Cook Islands. Calculations are based on 
data sourced from: Williams, supra note 89; Terawasi and Rodwell, supra note 90. 
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Fig. 6. Scale of interests from coastal State to flag State (2010).
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Fig. 7. Benchmark years. Value of all species caught by purse seine.
2010. These benchmark years were used in the WCPFC 2008 Conservation 
Measure for bigeye and yellowfin,94 and its later amended version from 2012.95
The figures show that seven of the core 14 States can be roughly identified 
as “purse-seine/skipjack States”. Most of these States are part of the group of 
coastal States that dominate the most productive fishing grounds (Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon 
94 WCPFC, CMM 2008–01 Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye and Yellowfin 
Tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, Fifth Regular Session of the Western and Cen-
tral Pacific Fisheries Commission (Guam, 8–12 December 2008). Available at http://www
.wcpfc.int.
95 WCPFC, Draft Decision on CMM2008–01, Eighth Regular Session of the Western and 
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Islands and Tuvalu). Most of the benefits that these six States enjoy from the 
WCPO tuna fisheries come from skipjack (compared to bigeye and yellow-
fin), purse-seine fisheries (compared to longline and other gear types) and 
licensing revenue for access to their EEZ (compared to their vessel registry 
interests).
The seventh of these purse-seine/skipjack States is the United States. The 
United States is dominated by its vessel registry interests due to the significant 
growth of its purse-seine fleet in recent years. This fleet provides greater catches 
from the WCPO tuna fisheries than the predominantly longline catch from 
within the EEZ of its territories and Hawaii. Although far less significant in 
the context of its overall interest, the United States also catches substantial 
amounts of bigeye through its Hawaiian longline fisheries.
China, Chinese Taipei, Indonesia, Japan, Marshall Islands, the Philippines 
and South Korea, all have fishing interests that are more widely distributed 
across multiple gear types. Each of these States is a significant flag State, while 
Indonesia, Japan, Marshall Islands and the Philippines also have significant 
coastal State catches. Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union, Marshall 
Islands, New Zealand, Solomon Islands, and the United States all reported 
that their registered purse-seine fishing vessels set on FADs more than 60% of 
the time and consequently are likely to have significant interests in purse-seine 
fisheries that set on FADs. Tuvalu similarly reported a strong interest in FADs 
for its EEZ. South Korean fleets on the other hand reported a far lower use 
of FADs.
Coastal and flag State interests are significant factors in the distribution of 
the conservation burden and benefit. States that are dominated by flag State 
or coastal State concerns are likely to suffer from conservation measures that 
limit fishing opportunities or impose a higher conservation burden on high 
seas fisheries (impact on flag States) or waters under national jurisdiction 
(impact on coastal States). Additionally, these States may favour measures that 
empower their authority and long term allocation aspirations through the 
implementation of limits by vessel (strengthening flag States) or zone (strength-
ening coastal States).96
Conservation and management measures may also have a heavy impact on 
developing coastal States that depend significantly on these fisheries and have 
96 The WCPFC currently implements purse-seine measures through area limits (i.e., by coastal 
State for EEZs and by flag State for high seas) and longline measures by flag State. See 
CMM2008–01. Available at http://www.wcpfc.int. For further discussion of flag-based versus 
zone-based limits, see: V Ram Bidesi and M Tsamenyi, ‘Implications of the Tuna Management 
Regime for Domestic Industry Development in the Pacific Island States’ (2004) 28 Marine 
Policy 383–392.
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strong aspirations to further develop these resources. Almost all of the key 
coastal States in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are developing States. These 
States are ultimately responsible for managing the majority of the WCPO 
tropical tuna fisheries and implementing conservation and management mea-
sures. In addition to their rights and responsibilities over the fisheries within 
their EEZs, they have significant interests in various fishing activities and 
aspire to further develop their interests and benefits. Some of these States will 
have few other development and resource options and will be more severely 
affected by the conservation burden than other States with diverse resources, 
large institutions and substantial revenue streams from multiple economic 
activities.
To date, these developing coastal States have successfully sought exemp-
tions for their developing fisheries from most conservation and management 
measures. While this satisfies short-term concerns, there is increasing recogni-
tion that these exemptions are significantly undermining the effectiveness of 
conservation and management measures.97 The interests of these developing 
coastal States would need to be substantially addressed and valued in a meth-
odology for distributing the conservation burden and benefit, if these exemp-
tions were to be removed.
Many of these same States are also home to coastal communities that 
depend heavily upon living marine resources for food security and employ-
ment in artisanal fisheries. In the Pacific islands, the tuna fisheries can repre-
sent an important source of protein and livelihoods.98 Similarly, coastal 
communities in Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam also depend heavily 
97 In 2009, John Hampton presented a SPC study that found that all exemptions were having 
a significant impact on the effectiveness of the 2008 Conservation and Management Measure 
for Bigeye and Yellowfin. See: J Hampton and S Harley, Assessment of the Potential Implications 
of Application of CMM-2008–01 for Bigeye and Yellowfin Tuna, Fifth Regular Session of the 
Scientific Committee to the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Port Vila, 
Vanuatu. 10–21 August, 2009). Available at http://www.wcpfc.int. In the long term, Pacific 
island States appear to accept that these broad exemptions will need to be replaced with spe-
cific measures. H Parris, ‘Tuna Dreams and Tuna Realities: Defining the term ‘maximising 
economic returns from the tuna fisheries’ in six Pacific island States’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 
105–113.
98 Scientists have recommended that Pacific island governments should increase local access to 
these tuna fisheries in order to partly meet increasing Pacific island food security requirements. 
Recent studies have estimated that 75% of Pacific island coastal fisheries will not meet forecast 
food security needs due to a forecast 50% growth in population by 2030, limited productivity 
of coastal fisheries (exacerbated by overfishing) and inadequate national distribution networks. 
J Bell, M Kronen, A Vunisea, W Nash, G Keeble, A Demmke, S Pontifex and S Andreafouet, 
‘Planning the Use of Fish for Food Security in the Pacific’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 64–76.
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on living marine resources for food security and livelihoods.99 The following 
coastal States are home to coastal communities that depend upon WCPO 
tuna fisheries for food security and artisanal employment to some degree: 
American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Indonesia, Japan, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Nauru, 
New Caledonia, Niue Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, USA 
Territories and Vanuatu.100 Many of the subsistence and artisanal fisheries 
that operate in these States and territories catch significant proportions of 
tuna.101 Given their food security interests, these coastal States will suffer from 
conservation measures that limit artisanal catches or inequitably transfer any 
conservation burden onto artisanal communities.102
The distribution of the conservation burden and benefit could also extend 
to other industries and markets. A number of States around the world, includ-
ing many of the core 14, have a commercial market interest in the WCPO 
tropical tuna fisheries through their consumption of tuna products. Tropical 
tuna are processed into a variety of products, ranging from minimally pro-
cessed fresh and frozen whole tuna (i.e., bigeye and yellowfin), through vari-
ous loining stages to fully processed canned retail products (i.e. skipjack and 
yellowfin). Canned tuna is one of the most significant products that originate 
from the WCPO purse-seine fisheries.
Thailand is the world’s largest processor of canned tuna. Thailand is also the 
recipient of almost half of the WCPO’s purse-seine catch.103 American Samoa, 
China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, the Philippines, and Papua New Guinea and 
the USA also have significant interests in domestic processing operations that 
are highly dependent upon consistent supplies of skipjack and yellowfin. 
 99 N Salayo, L Garces, M Pido, K Viswanathan, R Pomeroy, M Ahmed, I Siason, K Seng and 
A Masae, ‘Managing Excess Capacity in Small-Scale Fisheries: Perspectives from Stakeholders 
in Three Southeast Asian Countries’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 692–700.
100 Q Hanich, ‘Interest and Influence—Conservation and Management in the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission’ (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2011).
101 R Gillett, M McCoy, L Rodwell and J Tamata, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific 
Islands (Asian Development Bank and Forum Fisheries Agency, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 
2001).
102 While there has been no discussion within the WCPFC of limiting artisanal catches, it is 
noteworthy that the European Union delegate to the Kobe II International Workshop on 
RFMO Management of Tuna Fisheries suggested that the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
may need to consider limiting artisanal catches of tuna, given their impact on Indian Ocean 
tuna stocks. Personal notes. Comments by Mr Antonio Fernandez. European Commission 
Delegate. Comments made on 30 June 2010 at Kobe II International Workshop on RFMO 
Management of Tuna Fisheries. Brisbane, Australia. 29 June–1 July 2010.
103 Trimarine, Tuna Markets and Seiner Capacity. RFMO Tuna Management Workshop (Bris-
bane, Australia, 2010).
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Consequently each of these States has a strong interest in the continued oper-
ation of the skipjack and yellowfin fisheries and their provision of cheap raw 
material for their factories. Some WCPO States and territories also export 
various fresh, smoked and frozen products to global markets. Much of this 
requires minimal processing infrastructure compared to canning and loining, 
although some operations, such as katsuoboshi, require significant processing 
infrastructure. The interests within these States may suffer if conservation 
measures were to restrict supply seasonally (as could happen if the WCPFC 
were to adopt proposals to close the entire WCPO purse-seine fishery for 
3 months a year).104 Similarly, these States would suffer if the WCPFC failed 
to address sustainability concerns.
The largest consumer markets in the world for fresh, frozen, smoked and 
canned tuna are the USA, Japan and Europe.105 All of these markets, to some 
degree, depend upon the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries for their supply. In 
addition, markets in developing States are looking towards domestically pro-
duced and imported canned tuna to counter food insecurity and as a cheap 
form of protein.106 Within this context, conservation and management deci-
sions within the WCPFC, particularly in regard to skipjack and purse-seine 
fisheries, can quickly affect coastal food security and have significant repercus-
sions for local and global markets.107
Assessing Management Options and Distributing the Conservation 
Burden and Benefit
Within this complicated mix of interests, the WCPFC and its members must 
develop, negotiate and implement a conservation and management measure 
that includes a package of management options that will collectively achieve 
the conservation goal. The WCPFC can utilise a number of management 
options to meet these requirements. However, each of these management 
options will also directly and indirectly affect the areas of interest of the 
WCPFC members to varying degrees.
104 For example, in February 2011 an industry association that represents some tuna industry 
interests called for a three-month closure of the WCPO purse-seine fishery. International Sea-
food Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), Tuna Coalition Backs Seasonal Pacific Fishery Closure, 
ISSF. Available at: http://iss-foundation.org/2011/02/22/tuna-coalition-backs-seasonal-
pacific-fishery-closure/. Accessed on 23 February 2011.
105 C Catarsi, World Tuna Markets (FAO, Rome, Italy 2004).
106 Ibid.
107 Y Jeon, C Reid and D Squires, ‘Is There a Global Market for Tuna? Policy Implications for 
Tropical Tuna Fisheries’ (2008) 39 Ocean Development and International Law 32–50.
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In order to implement a new approach to distributing the conservation 
burden and benefit, we propose that the WCPFC develop a methodology 
based on four areas of interest (coastal State, flag State, market/consumer 
State, and developing State) and determine values for each interest field. The 
WCPFC would then adopt a ‘Burden-Sharing Conservation Measure’ that 
prescribes the decision-making framework for progressing through this meth-
odology and distributing any conservation burden and benefit. Fig. 8 illus-
trates how such an approach might work in practice through a decision tree 
that charts each step in the process.
Subsequently, if a concern with overfishing arises, then the WCPFC Scien-
tific Committee would have a clear mandate to advise on the necessary con-
servation response to address overfishing concerns and on the conservation 
measure options that would achieve this conservation response and their nec-
essary extent (i.e., restrictions or prohibitions on certain gear types, areal or 
seasonal closures, capacity limits, catch/effort limits). The WCPFC has not 
yet agreed on reference points, so in its absence, the conservation response 
must be consistent with the WCPF Convention. This requires that the con-
servation and management measure:
a. be based on the best scientific evidence available;
b.  ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO 
tuna fisheries and their optimum utilisation;
c.  maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic 
factors;
d.  adopt a precautionary approach;
e.  avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment and maintain the 
integrity of marine ecosystems;
f.  ensure that conservation and management measures do not result in 
transferring a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto 
developing State parties and territories.
In this example, the WCPFC Scientific Committee would advise that in order 
to maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustain-
able yield, the WCPFC adopt a measure that:108
108 WCPFC, Report of the Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, 
Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 9–17 August 2011). Available at http://www.wcpfc
.int.
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Fig. 8. A decision tree for distributing the conservation burden and benefit.
a.  reduces fishing mortality for bigeye by a minimum of 39% from 2004 
levels, or 28% from average 2001–04 levels, or 32% from average 2006–
09 levels;
b.  reduces fishing mortality of juvenile bigeye in order to increase potential 
yield and optimise utilisation;
c.  ensures no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin in the western 
equatorial region;
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d.  reduces fishing mortality of juvenile yellowfin in order to increase poten-
tial yield and optimise utilisation;
e.  implements precautionary limits on fishing activities for skipjack.
The WCPFC Scientific Committee would then advise on the key impacts and 
recommend alternative management options that balance different mixes of 
measures that limit longline catches of bigeye, restrict purse-seine fishing 
activities, limit pole-and-line catches of yellowfin in the Japanese region, and 
limit catches of bigeye and yellowfin within the Indonesian and Philippine 
fisheries. The Scientific Committee would be required to limit its proposed 
management options to only those that achieve the conservation targets for 
producing the maximum sustainable yield (until a harvest strategy is adopted 
that establishes agreed reference points).
The approach would then measure the impact of these alternative manage-
ment options against the four areas of interest and their agreed values. When 
measuring the management options against the areas of interest, the approach 
might consider the following impacts on these areas and their pre-agreed 
 values:
–  Seasonal closures: Some WCPFC members have supported the intro-
duction of seasonal closures on the purse-seine fishery in order to reduce 
fishing effort, and therefore reduce fishing mortality of bigeye, yellowfin 
and skipjack. The efficacy of this measure depends upon the degree to 
which the restriction truly removes the effort from the fishery. It is likely 
that fleets will respond through maximising non-fishing days (i.e., main-
tenance, transits, etc.) during seasonal closures in order to minimise 
reductions in fishing effort. Similarly, some fleets may attempt to trans-
fer their fishing effort to other fisheries during seasonal closures. The 
application of a seasonal closure is likely to significantly affect those 
coastal States and processing interests that have few options to mitigate 
the impact of seasonal closures, thereby raising concerns that such mea-
sures may disproportionately affect developing coastal State Parties.
–  Some WCPFC members have supported the introduction of area clo-
sures to reduce fishing effort and thereby reduce fishing mortality of 
bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack. As with seasonal closures, the efficacy of 
this measure depends upon the degree to which the restriction truly 
removes the effort from the fishery. It is likely that fleets will respond by 
migrating to other fishing zones such as EEZs, archipelagic waters and 
other high seas. The application of an area closure is likely to have most 
impact on hosting coastal States if the area occurs within an EEZ, or 
distant-water fishing States most if the measure closes areas of high seas. 
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The use of high seas closures in a mix of measures offers opportunities for 
the WCPFC to comply with the WCPF Convention’s Article 30 and 
avoid disproportionate transfers of conservation burden onto developing 
coastal States.
–  The WCPFC currently prescribes a three-month prohibition on the use 
of FADs by the purse-seine fishery. Recent assessments have indicated 
that this has been highly successful at reducing bigeye fishing mortality 
and has a strong impact on bigeye conservation. Assessments have also 
suggested that reductions in catches during the FAD closure may be 
offset by the larger average size of fish caught.109 Further restrictions and 
limitations on the numbers of FADs that can be set are likely to affect 
most members less than a total purse-seine closure, with minimal differ-
ence in conservation outcome. However, a FAD closure will significantly 
affect some fleets that have historically used FADs more than others, and 
also some coastal States where the use of FADs is higher than elsewhere. 
Other gear restrictions are also feasible, including restrictions on purse-
seine mesh size, time restrictions on deployment or retrieval, types of 
hooks, etc.
–  Some WCPFC members have strongly argued for the implementation of 
capacity limits to reduce effort, thereby reducing fishing mortality and 
increasing profitability. Various studies have also suggested that the prof-
itability of the WCPO tuna fisheries could be increased through signifi-
cant changes in fleet composition and reductions in most, if not all, 
fleets.110 Catches of bigeye and yellowfin by purse-seine fishing vessels, 
particularly juveniles in schools associated with FADs, provide a smaller 
benefit to the overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries than would be 
achieved if these fish had been allowed to mature and then be caught by 
109 J Hampton and P Williams, Analysis of Purse Seine Set Type Behaviour in 2009 and 2010, 
Seventh Regular Session of the Scientific Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fish-
eries Commission (Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia, 9–17 August 2011). Available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int.
110 M Bertignac, A Hand, J Hampton and H Campbell, A Bioeconomic Model of Longline, Pole 
and Line and Purse Seine Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific (ACIAR, Canberra, Aus-
tralia, 1998); H Campbell, ‘Managing Tuna Fisheries: A New Strategy for the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean’ (2000) 24(2) Marine Policy 159–163; M Bertignac, H Campbell, 
J Hampton and H Campbell, ‘Maximising Resource Rent from the Western and Central 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries’ (2000) 15 Marine Resource Economics 155–177; T Kompass and 
N C Tuong, ‘Economic Profit and Optimal Effort in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries’ (2006) 21(3) Pacific Economic Bulletin 46–62; R Hannesson and J Kennedy, ‘Rent-
Maximisation Versus Competition in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery’ (2009) 
1(1) Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research 49–65.
 Q. Hanich, Y. Ota /
  The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 28 (2013) 35
longline. If purse-seine FAD sets were prohibited, then these fish may 
potentially become available to the longline fishery for a far greater ben-
efit to the overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries. However, bio- 
economic modelling has found that the benefits from significant fleet 
restructuring and purse-seine reductions would be enjoyed dispropor-
tionately with detrimental impacts on coastal States with significant 
purse-seine fisheries.111 Capacity limits can also be undermined by effort 
creep, where vessels become faster, larger, more powerful and more effec-
tive at catching fish, thereby effectively increasing capacity. In addition, 
some members have strongly opposed capacity limits due to concerns 
that this would limit development opportunities for developing coastal 
States and impose a disproportionate conservation burden on develop-
ing State Parties. Such reductions in capacity could limit demand for 
access and potentially negatively affect coastal State access revenue. Con-
sequently, any resolution of issues related to overcapacity and fleet struc-
tures will likely require some mechanism to equitably distribute the 
reductions and benefits.
–  The WCPFC currently prescribes catch limits on the longline fishery 
for bigeye and yellowfin and effort limits on the purse-seine fishery. 
These two management options provide a relatively transparent manage-
ment mechanism for directly limiting fishing mortality. The efficacy of 
these management options depends on the consistency of the catch 
and effort limits with the scientific advice, and the monitoring of their 
implementation so as to avoid misreporting and discards. Any exemp-
tions or special conditions must be considered during the formulation of 
the measure to ensure that these do not inflate the total catch or effort 
beyond the recommended fishing mortality. The allocation of catch lim-
its to national fleets and effort limits to specific areas has avoided some 
of the problems inherent with “Olympic” limits, that motivate a race to 
fish, but further discussion is likely to be required to more fully allocate 
catches and effort for high seas fisheries. Such discussions can quickly 
become contentious given the lack of an agreed framework for the allo-
cation of such limits, and the need to ensure that any allocation of limits 
111 C Reid, M Bertignac and J Hampton, Further Development of, and Analysis Using, the West-
ern and Central Pacific Ocean Bioeconomic Tuna Model (WCPOBTM) (FFA and SPC, Honiara, 
Solomon Islands 2006); C Reid, Economic Implications of an Implicit Allocation of Bigeye Harvest 
Rights Through an Across the Board Reduction in Effort Levels in the Western and Central Pacific 
Tuna Fishery, FAO Sharing the Fish Conference. Perth, Australia. February 27–March 2, 2006. 
Accessed online July 2012 at: http://www.fishallocation.com/papers/pdf/presentations/Present-
ChristopherReid.pdf.
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does not result in a disproportionate burden of conservation action on 
developing State parties and territories. Other feasible effort limits can 
include further restrictions on transhipments at sea to reduce opportuni-
ties to continuously maintain fishing effort without interruption.
The methodology used to measure these impacts would then determine which 
of the alternate management options affected the areas of interest and values 
the least. The decision-making framework prescribed in the Burden-Sharing 
Conservation Measure would then prescribe that the management option 
with the minimal impact on the areas of interest and values be adopted.
Conclusion
This article recommends that RFMOs consider developing a new approach to 
the distribution of the conservation burden and benefit that separates political 
and equity arguments from fisheries science and better enables RFMOs to 
meet their conservation and equity obligations. The article recommends that 
RFMOs consider adopting conservation measures that prescribe such 
approaches and include methodologies for determining the scope of a conser-
vation measure and its impact on members.
Such an approach would enable RFMOs to expand on existing conserva-
tion and management processes to include this new ‘conservation burden’ 
step. This would be more relevant to the current context of declining fish 
stocks, as opposed to attempts to implement approaches to rights-based man-
agement that typically focus on dividing the “pie” (while in reality the pie is 
shrinking). This approach would also provide a greater degree of flexibility 
than existing models of rights-based management, and would avoid coastal 
State arguments that oppose RFMOs implementing rights-based manage-
ment frameworks over waters under their national jurisdiction. In this regard, 
the approach could be more likely to resolve “vested-interest” political obsta-
cles to the adoption of sufficiently strong conservation measures than existing 
concepts of rights-based management.
